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Abstract 
 
 
Religious market theory has figured prominently in recent scholarly debates in the 
social scientific study of religion in China. This article argues that the existence of “religious 
markets” should not be assumed as axiomatic but should be investigated as concrete social 
processes, distinguishing between market and non-market relations. Based on field research 
among popular religious and spiritual groups in China and drawing on the literature of 
economic anthropology, I propose an alternative model of a “religious gift economy” 
constituted by gifting exchanges between humans and between gods and humans. Five 
ethnographic cases from China illustrate the operation and coexistence of gift and market 
exchanges. In contemporary China, there is a tendency towards an increasing marketization 
of religion, with a simultaneous growth of religious movements explicitly offering non-
market forms of sociality. Rather than subsuming all exchanges under the blanket concept of 
the market, studies of religion must be attentive to the distinct logics of different models of 
exchange.  
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Religious market theory treats religious organizations as firms competing for market 
share among potential adherents within a religious economy consisting of all the religious 
activity in a society. This model  has in the past decade become one of the main theoretical 
currents in the sociology of religion in the United States (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Stark 
and Bainbridge 1996 [1987]; Iannacone 1991; Stark and Finke 2000). It has also been the 
subject of discussion among scholars of religion in China including sociologists, 
anthropologists, historians and sinologists, and has been applied by scholars to analyse sets 
of religious groups and practitioners ranging from the 14th century to the present, in Taiwan, 
mainland China and Hong Kong, and covering salvationist movements and redemptive 
societies (Seiwert 2003; Lu 2008), communal temples (Lang, Chan and Ragvald 2005; Chan 
and Lang 2011), self-cultivation masters (Goossaert 2011), and Falun Gong (Lu 2005).  It 
has also been used and modified to explain the overall dynamics of religious change in China 
under a socialist regime (F. Yang 2006; 2010), and has stimulated heated debates among 
scholars and policymakers in the Peoples’ Republic of China.  
These theoretical models, studies and debates have provided a fruitful stimulus to the 
development of social scientific approaches to the study of Chinese religion, and to the 
testing and modification of theories developed in a primarily Protestant, American context 
to a culture, history and political system so vastly different as China’s. While the religious 
market model has been criticised for being overly derived from Western Christianity and 
thus inapplicable to other areas and religious cultures (Sharot 2002), the published evidence 
so far demonstrates that the model, often in modified form, can be applied in Chinese cases, 
providing insights into the dynamics of the Chinese religious sphere. However, I argue that 
these insights may come at the cost of misreading the basic social processes at the heart of 
religious life.  
 
Literal or metaphorical markets? 
 
It is tempting to use the language of the market to describe the competition among 
religious groups. One aspect is competition for members. The pool of potential members 
can be treated as a market, in which there is a demand for religion, and religious groups act 
as firms, competing with each other to satisfy that demand. While economic theorists 
postulate that all human activity is economic, they also tend to follow the false assumption 
that all economic activity is analogous to the exchanges between commercial enterprises and 
their customers. In “Definition 32” of Starke and Finke’s theory, for example,  “A religious 
economy consists of all the religious activity going on in any society: a “market” of current 
and potential adherents, a set of one or more organizations seeking to attract and maintain 
adherents, and the religious culture offered by the organization(s).” (Stark and Finke 2000: 
283). Elsewhere, religious organizations are described as firms competing with each other to 
offer rewards to current and potential adherents; free competition in an unregulated religious 
market leads to them becoming more dynamic and effective (Stark and Finke 2000: 194-195, 
218-220). These definitions transplant onto the religious field a logic of commercial firms 
competing for market share, positioning themselves strategically to maximise and expand the 
number of adepts.  
  The dictionary definition of a market is derived from the archaic meaning of “the 
act or an instance of buying and selling”; and designates “a meeting together of people for the 
purpose of trade by private purchase and sale and usually not by auction” or “the area of 
economic activity in which buyers and sellers come together and the forces of supply and 
demand affect prices” (Merriam-Webster.com, italics added). What all these references to 
buyers and sellers, buying and selling, private purchase and sale, prices and so on refer to is 
the exchange of commodities for money or its equivalent. When such an exchange occurs, as 
a private purchase between a buyer and seller, there is a market. To the extent that a religious 
organization is engaged in producing and selling  commodities, it can be counted as a 
commercial firm. However, as I demonstrate below, there are fundamental differences and 
even dynamic tensions between commercial markets in the strict sense of the term, and the 
religious markets described by sociologists. This begs the question of whether it is 
appropriate to use market metaphors to theorize social relations in which the above-
mentioned conditions do not apply, and which are not characterized by buying and selling.  
The religious market model is based on the blanket use of a market metaphor to 
explain all social relations and all religious phenomena. The chief proponents of the market 
model – Stark, Bainbridge, Finke and Iannacone – insist that they do not use markets as a 
metaphor, but as a reality – religion is a market (Stark and Finke 2000: 36), consisting of 
buyers and sellers, consumers and producers (Iannacone 1995: 77). Perhaps the issue is 
purely one of semantics, religious market theorists preferring to include within a single, more 
encompassing concept of the market, what belongs to quite distinct classes of social 
relations.  If it were simply a question of choice of words, there would be little need to spill 
much ink on this debate. But behind a seemingly innocuous choice of words lies what the 
religious market theorists themselves proclaim to be a “paradigm shift.” While the new 
paradigm aims to challenge the dominance of the worn-out secularization thesis in the 
sociology of religion, it also implies a shift in emphasis in the types of questions and answers 
to be posed by social scientists.  
 Indeed, in the economic paradigm, forms of social relations are relevant primarily to 
the extent that they affect changes in market share. In his study of the rise of Christianity, 
Stark claims that among the many factors which led Christianity to become the Roman 
Empire’s dominant religion was that Christianity was a radically new type of community, 
leading to higher levels of mutual care and cohesion, a higher status of women, a higher level 
of inter-ethnic solidarity, and other aspects, in relation to the pagan forms of religious 
organization of the time. The nature of such a community would appear to be of 
fundamental sociological importance – but, for Stark, these aspects are of interest only to the 
extent that they are causal factors in the increase in numbers of Christian converts. Indeed, 
the question that really matters in the market theory of religion is identifying the “winners 
and losers” according to market share (Finke and Stark 1992).  
In his study of Christianity’s competition against paganism in the Roman empire, 
Stark stresses how most pagan cults were client cults in which gods and priests were 
approached in a logic of commercial transactions, limiting the sense of community and 
belonging of pagan cults, compared to early Christian groups, which became known for 
practicing the love of one’s neighbour more intensely than other groups, creating stronger 
bonds. “You did not approach Christian clergy to purchase religious goods, but to be guided 
in fulfilling the religious life. Nor were the clergy distanced from their flocks – they were not 
an initiated elite holding back arcane secrets, but teachers and friends, selected, as [the 
famous Christian apologist] Tertullian explained, ‘not by purchase, but by established 
character’.” Stark goes on to quote a telling passage from the apologist:  
“There is no buying and selling of any sort in the things of God. Though we have our treasure-chest, 
it is not made up of purchase-money, as of a religion that has its price. On the monthly day, if he 
likes, each puts in a small donation; but only if it be his pleasure, and only if he is able; for there is 
no compulsion; all is voluntary. These gifts are, as it were, piety’s deposit fund.” (Stark 1996). 
 
 It is ironic that, according to Stark, the “winner” in the Roman religious market was 
the religion which was the least marketized, and it was precisely those non-commercial 
features which made it so attractive. If early Christianity owes its success to being so unlike a 
commercial firm, one is led to wonder if the behaviour of firms in a market can be an 
accurate model for the dynamics of religious movements?  
The same question comes to mind if we consider Stark and Bainbridge’s earlier work 
on new religious movements. In The Future of Religion, they make a strong distinction between 
“audience cults” and “client cults” on the one hand -- which, according to Stark and 
Bainbridge, are not fully-fledged religions -- and what they call the fully religious cult and sect 
movements on the other hand, which can mobilise the long-term, sustained commitment of 
their followers. The distinction they offer is that audience and client cults cannot generate 
sustained commitment because they only offer magic, in the form of weak, specific 
“compensators” often lacking supernatural content and which can be disproved by science, 
while religions offer general compensators or explanations which are less vulnerable to 
scientific disproof and require long-term commitment to be obtained (Stark and Bainbridge 
1985: 32-33). Stark and Bainbridge base their categorization on the content of beliefs, relying 
on contested distinctions between magic, the supernatural, science and religion, and 
compensators. Strangely, as market theorists, they omit to note the objective sociological 
distinction between the two: audience and client cults operate as commercial firms selling 
books, films, lectures and services to clients, whereas cult or sect movements are not in the 
business of one-off or periodic commercial transactions. The long-term loyalty and  
commitment of adherents may well be directly related to the non-market structure of 
religious movements. And according to the religious market theory, in the competition 
between religious groups, the most successful ones are the higher-tension groups, those 
which generate a higher intensity of communal ties. These communal ties are qualitatively 
different from market relations, and, indeed, often constitute themselves consciously and 
explicitly in opposition to commercial transactions.  Again, if the most successful groups are 
those which behave the least like commercial firms, we might question whether firms are the 
best model to describe them – and we might ask what does produce higher-intensity ties and 
commitment.  
Stark and Finke are correct in placing relationships with gods at the centre of 
religious life. They note that the scriptures of many religions use a language of exchange, and 
promise quite explicit rewards for devotion to a god (Stark and Finke 2000: 40). Where they 
err is in modeling all forms of exchange on commercial transactions, using language such as 
how much “divine beings can charge for their favor”, discussing the “price” of exchange, 
“periodic payments,” and so on (p. 96, 99). Undoubtedly, as rational actors, people will tend 
to follow the most beneficial line of action (p. 36-39) – but it does not follow that the most 
beneficial line of action is always to behave like a consumer. Market exchanges are only one 
of many forms of exchange; not all costs, rewards and relationships can be subsumed into a 
market.  
Both of Stark’s examples of Roman paganism vs. early Christianity, and of 
contemporary North American “audience” and “client” cults vs. religious “movements,” 
reveal an opposition between different forms of social exchange: (1) markets for 
magic/religious commodities according to the strict definition of the term, in which 
products and services are bought and sold, and which are contrasted with (2) exchanges 
which create religious communities and movements on a non-market basis. Notwithstanding 
the theorists’ denials, we can only treat as metaphorical the use of market concepts to analyse 
the latter type of exchange. To be sure, it can be useful to use various metaphors to gain 
insight on social reality, just as we may speak of the “marketplace of ideas” or so on. But if 
the “metaphorical” firms are organized along fundamentally different principles than 
“literal” firms, and if it is this difference which defines them as more purely “religious” and 
explains their sustained growth and membership commitment, then we might be well 
advised to closely examine the difference between the two, and question the utility of the 
metaphor.  
The market model works best as a metaphor in the case of the dynamics of 
competition between expansionist salvationist movements – which, in the Chinese context, 
can include redemptive societies such as Yiguandao 一貫道, Falungong 法輪功, and many 
Chinese Christian sects (see Palmer 2011b). Since these groups are not commercial firms and 
do not literally “sell” salvation, they do not constitute a market in the strict sense of the 
term. However, to the degree that salvationist groups consider themselves to be the sole 
path to salvation, discourage or forbid participation in other religious or spiritual movements 
than their own, consider salvation to be a primarily individual matter, consider salvation to 
be achieved at the moment of initiation or joining, are committed to unlimited expansion, 
and subscribe to apocalyptic prophecies which give a sense of intense urgency to their 
mission, such groups enter a logic in which numerical growth may tend to become their 
ultimate purpose as an organization. And to the degree that they exclude membership or 
participation in other religions, these groups’ growth becomes a zero-sum game in which 
one group’s growth will often be achieved at the expense of others. Although such groups 
are not commercial firms, the dynamic engendered by this model of exclusivist individual 
salvationism is, in many ways, similar to the logic of a marketplace, in which religious sects 
compete with each other to recruit adherents and increase “market share”. We thus end up 
with the dynamic described by Stark and Finke of ‘a “market” of current and potential 
adherents, a set of one or more organizations seeking to attract and maintain adherents, and 
the religious culture offered by the organization(s).’ Indeed, the religious market model is 
derived precisely from the dynamics of competition between exclusivist salvationist sects, 
which are the most dynamic component of the American religious culture. But on the other 
hand, these groups’ emphasis on moral purity and detachment from worldly desires, and 
their duty to share the path to salvation for free, as a gift to others – generates social relations 
among followers, and between followers and non-followers, which cannot be created 
through market transactions. Thus, we can speak here of a metaphorical or quasi-market, and 
not of a market in the strict sense of the term. This quasi-market is of a quite different 
nature than commercial markets for religious books, objects, rituals, healings and other 
services. And, as will be shown through the examples below, it constitutes only a part of the 
overall field of non-market religious activity.  
 
An alternative model: the religious gift economy 
 
The uncritical extension of market metaphors and models to non-market relations 
and exchanges, making no theoretical difference between commercial transactions and other 
forms of exchange, may produce a dangerous conceptual blind spot and obscure a 
fundamental theme in the religious formation of social relations. I contend that there is a 
significant difference between market transactions in the strict sense of the term, and other 
forms of human relations and exhanges.  
Taking an anthropological standpoint, I argue that, rather than beginning with the a 
priori assumption that all human activity consists of market exchanges, human interactions 
should be observed and described empirically, and models inductively constructed from 
recurring patterns of observable human relations. Applied to the economic realm, concrete 
forms of production, distribution, circulation and exchange should be described and 
categorized in terms of their distinct patterns and structures. The economist Karl Polanyi 
articulated this position most forcefully when he criticized the “economistic fallacy” which 
consists of “equating the human economy in general with its market form […] to stretch the 
concept of the market until it embraces all economic phenomena is artificially to invest all 
things economic with the peculiar characteristics that accompany the phenomenon of the 
market.” (Polanyi 1977: 5-6) Shifting the focus from supply and demand, Polanyi defined the 
human economy as “an institutionalized process of interaction which functions to provide 
material means in a society” (1977: 34), and drew the attention of economists to non-market 
economic institutions, such as reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi 1968). Anthropologist 
Marshall Sahlins offered a similar definition of the economy, as “the process of (materially) 
provisioning society” (Sahlins 2004 [1974]: 185 n.1, 187 n.2), building on a long tradition of 
research in economic anthropology stimulated by classic works by Malinowski on the kula 
ring of the Trobiand Islanders (1922) and by Marcel Mauss on the gift (1967 [1925]).   
  I will not dwell here on the problem of using a market model to understand the 
social provision of spiritual means by religion, stretching the economistic fallacy even further 
than that critiqued by Polanyi, applying market paradigms outside the economy itself. Rather, 
my focus here is on the economic dimension of religion. As social organizations, religious 
groups receive, manage and use material and human resources. They have their own internal 
economies, and, as important nodes of social relations, they play important roles in the 
general economy. A growing body of work on Buddhist monasticism in Chinese history, for 
example, has documented its role in the general economic organization of mediaeval and late 
imperial Chinese society (Gernet 1998; Kieschnick 2003). Other studies have analysed the 
interplay between ritual systems, the flow of capital, and political authority in Chinese history 
(Duara 1988; Gates 1996) and in contemporary popular religion (M. Yang 2000: 480; Dean 
2009). As the latter studies have illustrated, what Mayfair Yang and Kenneth Dean call the 
“ritual economy” in Southeast China – which accounts for a large proportion of economic 
activity in some areas -- produces quite different pathways of capital flows than in the 
market economy.  
Economic anthropologists have proposed several typologies of forms of economic 
exchange. These generally posit a distinction between the “market economy” and the “gift 
economy,” with many studies exploring the logic of the gift and its social implications. 
Marcel Mauss, in The Gift, defined the object of his inquiry as “prestations which are in 
theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested” 
(Mauss 1967 [1925]: 1). He noted that in primitive societies, there was little exchange of 
goods between individuals through markets; rather, most exchanges took the form of gifts 
between groups – clans, tribes, and families – which exchanged not only goods and material 
wealth, but also “courtesies, entertainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children, 
dances, and feasts; and fairs in which the market is but one element and the circulation of 
wealth but one part of a wide and enduring contract. Finally, although the prestations and 
counter-prestations take place under a voluntary guise they are in essence strictly obligatory, 
and their sanction is private or open warfare” (3). Mauss viewed the gift as a “total social 
phenomenon” which gave expression to the religious, legal, moral, and economic institutions 
of society. He identified three distinct obligations in the process of gift exchange: the 
obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to repay (37-41), producing 
the endless cycles of ritualized gift exchanges, “imbued with religious elements”, 
“impregnated with ritual and myth” (70), which constitute the pattern of social relations in 
traditional societies. These exchanges do not conform to the principles of “utilitarian” 
economics, with exchanges “couched in terms of purchase and sale,” based on “the 
calculation of individual needs” (63, 69, 75).  Finally, it is gift exchange and obligation which 
transform “war, isolation and stagnation” into the social bonds which are the foundation of 
civility (80-81, also Sahlins 2004 [1972]: 149-184).  
Mauss’s insights have stimulated a vast literature and many debates among 
anthropologists, which it is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize here (see Sykes 
2005). It is important to remember that the concept of the gift and gift economy does not 
designate a single, monolithic rule, but subsumes an extremely wide range of forms of 
exchange and reciprocity, which some scholars have attempted to categorize according to a 
polarity ranging from the “solidary extreme” of “generalised reciprocity” between close kin 
to the mid-point of “balanced reciprocity” between more distant relations and ending at the 
“unsociable extreme” of “negative reciprocity” of raids and tit-for-tat (Sahlins 2004[1972]: 
193-196). For the purpose of the present discussion, I retain the following points from this 
literature:  
1. A “gift” is defined not by the nature of the thing given (which can be 
material, hospitality, labour, or any form of help or assistance) but by the nature of the 
exchange, as outlined below.  
2. A gift is inalienable, in that, once given, it retains a connection to the original 
giver. Gifts are remembered and their stories are part of the memories of the things 
exchanged and of the relationships between those who give and receive (Gregory 1982; 
Weiner 1992.) 
3. A gift is a moral act which enacts norms of what it means to be a person of 
honour and moral worth, and brings into play principles and emotions of generosity and 
gratitude. It creates an imbalance between the moral superiority of the giver and the 
obligation and indebtedness of the receiver; an imbalance which can be redressed through 
reciprocation at a later time (M. Yang 1994). 
4. Gifting enacts existing social relationships or establishes new ones. Social 
relationships of many kinds can be mapped by plotting sequences of gift exchanges. At high 
levels of social solidarity, gifting is continual and indeterminate, and there is little mental 
“accounting” of precise gifts and reciprocation (such as within the members of a household, 
or between very close kin), while, in more distant social relations, mental accounting does 
occur, and failure to reciprocate in the proper manner may jeopardize the relationship. 
Through paternalistic generosity (noblesse oblige) and grateful servitude, gifting can instantiate 
and legitimize social hierarchies. On the other hand, agonistic and competitive giving can 
also occur between parties jostling for moral superiority over each other (Sahlins 2004 
[1972]).  
5. Gifting combines altruism and self-interest, freedom and obligation in subtle 
and ambiguous ways. It would be entirely misleading to analyse gifting according to any 
single one of these terms.  
6. There are other inalienable possessions which are off limits (or severely 
restricted) in gift exchange: sacred objects, memories or knowledge which constitute the core 
of a group’s identity and existence. These possessions cannot be legitimately transferred to 
anyone else. The only way one can attain them is to become part of the group which 
possesses them, through alliance, initiation or conversion: a change of identity and 
ontological transformation of the person (Weiner 1992; Godelier 1996).  
7. The “gift” can be contrasted to the “commodity” on all of the above points. 
The commodity is also defined by the nature of the exchange which constitutes it: the 
commercial transaction of alienable objects, in which payment is immediate and equivalent, 
theoretically involving no social relationship beyond the single transaction; past owners have 
no rights on new owners and the latter have no obligations to previous owners. Rather than 
establishing or maintaining social relations, the purpose of commodity exchange is meeting 
the demand for specific goods (Gregory 1982).  
8. Gift and market economies co-exist in the same societies: one is not 
exclusive to traditional cultures and the other to modern cultures. A legitimate space for 
haggling, markets, and short-term acquisitive economic behaviour co-exists with the more 
morally-laden norms of gift exchange and long-term sacred obligations. The line between the 
two economies, however, may be ambiguous and shifting. When the former is seen as 
encroaching on the latter, however, it generates a discourse of moral outrage and rejection of 
the “evil” nature of markets and money (Bloch and Parry 1989).   
 
To these points discussed at length in the literature, I would like to add another 
aspect which was only briefly alluded to by Mauss and, though developed by Godelier (1996), 
its significance to the entire gift economy has not been fully measured. This pertains to the 
gift exchanges between humans and gods, bringing us to the heart of our discussion of 
religion. A few aspects of these exchanges are worth mentioning here:  
 
1. A cult to a god is usually established and maintained to repay the god for 
some blessing or favour and, through continued offerings of gifts, hoping that future 
blessings will be conferred. A religious cult is thus a gift exchange between gods and humans, 
with both parties engaged in cycles of giving, to receiving, and repaying each other.  This 
type of relationship can exist between the god and collective bodies such as families, lineages, 
geographic communties or religious congregations, and between the god and individuals.  
2. Since gods do not physically remove the offerings they receive to another 
world, the offerings are in fact often redistributed to the community. If the gift is an animal 
offered in sacrifice, it is consumed in a communal feast; if the gift is offering one’s life in 
service to the god, the concrete acts of service, charity and compassion are directed to others. 
The organization which manages a cult comes into being thanks to these gifts and is 
essentially their trustee. Its responsibility is to manage the collective exchanges with the god 
and to allocate and redistribute the resources generated by the cult. Gifts to gods, therefore, 
create community, organization and redistributive networks in a very tangible way. They 
constitute an important node in the overall gift economy.  
3. The redistributive nature of gifts to gods reveals the existence of a distinct 
type of gifting relationship. In reciprocal gifting in the Maussian sense, the giver expects 
delayed reciprocity from the receiver. It is a dyadic relationship between the two parties only. In 
a religious gift economy, the god – or a spiritual reality or principle such as karma – is a third 
partner in the exchange. In this case, a gift is dedicated to a god, but actually given to 
another person. It is the god who will reward the giver, and not the actual recipient of the 
gift. Or, put in other terms, a gift may be given to another person, but the recipient is not 
expected to reciprocate: the giver knows that he will benefit from future divine or karmic 
recompense. The giver need not expect anything in return from the actual receiver of the 
gift. In fact, as noted by Philip Clart in his study of Taiwanese morality books, in the case of 
gifts anonymously given or received, there may no direct contact between the giver and 
receiver – but the receiver may reciprocate to the god and/or to others (Clart 2009: 141-
142). The “third partner” opens the way for charity and all other forms of religious altruism.  
Now, out of a sense of gratitude or obligation, the recipient may want to repay the 
gift – but, instead of reciprocating to the original giver, he may repay the god, joining the 
community of those engaged in its worship. And that offering may be expressed through yet 
another act of generosity or compassion to others – thus further expanding the network of 
giving. These three-party chains of exchange between gods and humans constitute a religious 
gift economy, which is distinct from the reciprocal dyads in which gods or spiritual causality are 
absent.  
 
On the basis of the above points, we can thus say that the cult of a god is the nexus 
of a gift economy, founded on giving between the god and humans, and between humans. A 
religious community is formed by the mutual generation of these gifting relationships. And 
to the extent that such exchanges, and the obligations they generate, are extended outward 
or not, the community may grow or contract. I submit that this “religious gift economy” 
model of religious groups offers a more empirically accurate framework  than the “religious 
firms” concept for understanding many (though certainly not all) forms of non-market 
religious relations.  
 
Ethnographic cases 
 
In the following section, I offer five ethnographic cases of contemporary Chinese 
spiritual/religious organizations taken from my ethnographic research, examining their 
patterns of social relations and exchange, identifying those patterns that constitute gift and 
market relations, and analysing how the actors define and position themselves in relation to 
marketization: popular communal cults in rural Northern Guangdong and urban Hong 
Kong; qigong networks in Chengdu in the 1990’s; Daoist cultivators; Confucian volunteers; 
and Buddhist philanthropists. Analysed in reference to the broader scholarship on these 
forms of Chinese religiosity, in each case we can identify the simultaneous operation of gift 
and market economies.  In some cases, we can also identify  a trend of “marketization” in 
which previously non-market forms of religiosity are brought into the logic of market 
relations. We can also see how this trend is opposed by discourses and practices critical of 
religious commodification, creating a counter-trend of “anti-marketization” of religious life.  
 
Chinese communal religion 
 
In the township of Huanghua 黃花 in Yingde 英德 County, some 250 km north of 
Guangzhou, as well as many surrounding townships, traditional religious culture is lively and, 
in the villages where I conducted fieldwork during several trips between 2004 and 2008, the 
important ritual cycles continued even during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Each 
alliance of villages has its own temple at which several local deities are worshipped, including 
the creator god Pangu 盤古 and the local goddess Caozu 曹祖娘娘. The main activities of 
each temple are communal jiao 醮 rituals held in cycles of one, three and five years, with the 
largest rituals -- lasting four days and three nights -- occurring at five-year intervals. Jiao 
rituals are also conducted for the renovation and consecration of temples. Each temple’s 
rituals are organized by a committee of senior male representatives of each village which is a 
member of the ritual alliance. Most villages are dominated by a single lineage. There are two 
dominant and several minor lineages in the ritual alliance, which consists of around two 
dozen villages within walking distance of the temple, sharing a plain connected by river to 
the market town of Huanghua. Besides the government-managed primary school and village 
government office (a small house containing the village committee desk, the Party 
committee meeting room, and a classroom for family planning lessons), the temple is the 
only other public building in the area and the only self-governed non-kinship-based local 
association.  The temple committee hires a troupe of priests, called nan-mouh 喃嘸, to 
conduct the periodic jiao rituals. The priests combine two liturgies, one Buddhist and one of 
the Lüshan 閭山  Daoist tradition, which they perform simultaneously at two altars 
designated respectively as the “civil” wen 文 and “martial” wu 武 altars.  Most priests are 
peasants who work part-time as ritual specialists. They all share the same repertoire which 
includes not only jiao liturgies but also funerals, birth rituals, and healing rites. They are 
trained in ritual techniques as disciples of a senior priest, but operate independently and 
serve individual clients and temples throughout the area which shares the same ritual 
traditions. When a temple decides to hold a jiao, it contracts the ritual to a senior priest, who 
will then hire and direct an ad hoc troupe of a dozen priests required to perform the necessary 
rites. In order to cover the costs of the ritual, which includes not only the priests’ salaries but 
also the temporary altars, sheds, petitions to the gods and other paper paraphernalia which 
will be offered and burned, the temple committee collects an obligatory cash contribution 
from each household in the villages of the ritual alliance, as well as voluntary donations from 
villagers who wish to offer more than the obligatory fee. The names of all contributors are 
meticulously recorded on rolls which are, during the rites, communicated to the gods by 
chanting and burning. Voluntary donors also carry home a framed certificate which they 
proudly display in their homes. All contributions, whether obligatory or voluntary, are in 
effect made to the gods, to pay for the resplendent ritual offerings which are a gift to honour 
and glorify the gods. The temple committee is the trustee of these funds, and posts detailed 
accounts on the temple walls.  During the jiao ritual, women bring offerings of tea, fruit, and 
dried tofu to the gods, representing their households and hoping that the gods will respond 
by conferring blessings on their families (Palmer 2011c; Tam 2009).  
From this brief description, we can identify several of Chau’s “modalities” of doing 
religion (see Chau, this issue) and several types of relationships and exchanges, some of 
which are clearly economic in nature. But is this a religious market? There is clearly a market 
for ritual services: funerals, healing rites, and jiao rituals, which are performed by priests who 
offer their services for hire in a manner analogous to a petty capitalist craftsman, freelance 
actor or family enterprise (Chau 2006b). However, this market for ritual services represents 
only a segment of the “religious economy.” Firstly, the priests’ liturgies are only part of the 
total activity of the “event production” of a ritual; much of the coordination, labour, 
materials, cooking, music, and other elements are provided for free by the non-specialist 
clients themselves and their networks of kin and neighbours, drawing on the common 
knowledge and abilities diffused in the general culture (Chau 2005a), and offered in the 
context of the gift economy. Secondly, the main religious institution, the temple, is 
communal property, built and financed collectively by the resident households of the alliance, 
and managed by the senior men of moral stature whom they designate as their 
representatives, and who carry out their roles in a volunteer capacity. The temple committee 
is not into the business of selling religious services; rather, through staging rituals, it 
maintains a gifting relationship with the gods, seeking to secure divine blessings and 
protection for the community that built the temple. Thus, the temple and its rituals, rather 
than a firm providing services to clients external to itself, are the material embodiment of the 
gifting relation with the gods, which itself secures the alliance between the member villages.  
Though there are many temples in the area, each temple represents a distinct alliance 
of villages. Temples compete to stage more grandiose rituals, but this competition is a rivalry 
for prestige among neighbours, and not market competition to attract new customers (Eng 
and Lin 2002). Indeed, the membership base of a temple is fixed, since it is ascriptive – all 
residents of the alliance villages are automatically members, and non-residents cannot join.  
The ritual culture in this community is simpler than that described in other studies of 
rural Chinese popular religion, which may include overlapping ritual alliances, an intense 
ritual calendar, and a wide range of ritual specialists competing with or complementary to 
each other (see notably Dean 1993; 1998; Chau 2006b; Dean and Zheng 2010).  In the 
“ritual polytropy” described by Chau in his contribution to this issue, some ritual specialists 
are hired in a commercial transaction, while others – the Confucians – do not collect a fee 
and are thanked with gifts, earning them the reputation of being “morally superior”. In other 
cases, notably in parts of North China, liturgies are extremely simple and can be conducted 
without hiring priests, or are offered for free or for a fee by amateur scripture-recitation 
groups (Jones 2011).  These cases show that the market for ritual services varies in size and 
structure in different regions, within a broader religious culture which involves forms of gift 
exchange ranging from self-production, reciprocal exchanges, and amateur volunteer service. 
And in most of these cases, village temples are self-governing community associations with 
ascriptive membership, rather than commercial firms serving voluntary clients. 
In large cities and tourist areas, however, a different pattern can be observed. In 
Hong Kong, for instance, funerals have become entirely commercialized. Daoist priests are 
organized in firms which offer set menus of complete, standardized and convenient funeral 
packages for busy urban workers. The clients have no relationship with the priests before or 
after the transaction, and need not organize or provide anything themselves (Chan 2003). At 
the same time, there is growing competition in the market for jiao communal ritual services 
for the indigenous villages of the New Territories, as some urban Daoist temples have begun 
offering Quanzhen jiao liturgies for a lower cost than the Zhengyi priests who have 
traditionally served the villages (Lai, Yau and Wu 2009). In contrast to the rural Guangdong 
temple I described above, urban Hong Kong residents (with the exception of indigenous 
villagers of the New Territories) have no ascriptive ties to a community temple and ritual 
cycle of their own; they go to temples only as individuals to pray for blessings for themselves 
and their families, are entirely free to choose which temple to visit, if at all, and, for the most 
part, have no sustained relationship with the temple, or any relationship with temple staff or 
other worshippers. In such a context, temples become more like providers of services to 
individual clients. In addition to providing free access to a shrine for worshipping,  they may 
also provide fee-charging services for fortune-telling, sell paper incense and paper offerings, 
rent lamps for blessings in the shrine halls, and -- especially lucrative -- rent niches for 
storing funerary urns. Temples are thus present in several markets and compete not only 
with other temples but also with non-temple-based fortune-tellers, columbariums, and 
freelance ritual specialists for the paid custom of worshippers within the same population, 
who can choose among several temples and other service providers. Factors such as location, 
convenience of transportation, adaptability and responsiveness to demand thus play a role in 
the relative popularity of different temples, such as Wong Tai Sin, the most popular temple 
in Hong Kong (Lang and Ragvald 1993). At the same time, most Hong Kong public urban 
temples are incorporated as charitable societies and managed by lay religious associations 
with their own sacred history and mission. At the core of these associations is their cult, a 
gifting relationship between the association and the deities or Buddhas, in which the building 
and expansion of the temple and its services can be construed as gift offerings to both the 
gods and to the community. They offer a range of free services such as Chinese medical 
clinics, activities for the elderly, government-subsidized primary schools and old age homes, 
and a range of philanthropic projects. Thus, Hong Kong temples operate simultaneously in 
the logics of the market, of philanthropy, and of publicly-funded social services. The excess 
revenue generated from the commercial or fee-collecting operations of temples serves to 
finance their philanthropic activities. The religious gift economy is at the core, while market 
activities are undertaken to funnel further resources into it.  
In mainland China, another configuration often arises because the main urban and 
tourist temples are not owned and managed by autonomous communities – whether 
ascriptive as in traditional villages or neighbourhoods, or voluntary as in the associations that 
own the Hong Kong temples.  They are either owned by state-sponsored Buddhist and 
Daoist associations and managed by monks and officials, or by other government 
departments such as Cultural Relics or Tourism. In the latter case, temples may be leased out 
to private entrepreneurs, who invest in the premises, hire monks as staff, and offer a range 
of products and services to generate income streams (Chan and Lang 2011).  These temples 
operate under a fully commercial business model and see themselves competing for 
customers in a tourist and religious market. The religious gift economy is weak or absent in 
these operations.  
 
The qigong boom of the 1990s 
The Natural Gas Transportation Division of the Sichuan Petroleum Administration 
was a typical socialist “Work Unit” (danwei 單位) in the early 1990’s, a self-contained 
compound of drab concrete blocks on a hill surrounded by rice paddies at some distance 
from the city of Chengdu, providing its 2000 employees with dormitories, a supermarket, a 
cinema, a fitness room, a karaoke hall, a school, a dispensary, a sports field, and a single 
street with an outdoor vegetable market and a few small restaurants and karaoke bars 
operated by local peasant entrepreneurs. The entire space was owned and controlled by the 
Work Unit, and there was no religious life of any sort. Most people had lived and worked in 
the Work Unit for decades, if not spent their whole life in it, and their only exposure to 
religious culture was through classical literature, images of Daoism and Buddhism gleaned 
from popular martial arts films and novels from Hong Kong, and notions of Christianity 
derived from British Victorian novels, recent Hollywood films, and Marxist theory. The 
workday was short and far from exhausting; there was much time for leisure, but, given the 
small size and relatively remote location of the Work Unit, few options were available. One 
popular activity was the practice of qigong breathing and gymnastic exercises in groups, 
usually early in the morning but also in the evening. Starting at dawn and until worktime, at 
various spots in the compound – the open space in front of the entrance to an office 
building; a basketball field; the fountain in front of the cinema – groups of qigong 
practitioners congregated and practiced the exercises in unison, led by a volunteer enthusiast, 
often to the rhythm of classical Chinese music playing on a tape recorder. Each group 
practiced a different method: one group of old ladies did “Fragrant Qigong” (xianggong 香功), 
another group, engineers on training from oilfields around China, did the “Numinous Qigong 
of the Nine Resonances” (jiuying shengong 九應神功), yet another group of residents, led by a 
primary school teacher, did “The Chinese Qigong for Nourishing Health and Increasing 
Intelligence” (zhonghua yangsheng yizhi gong 中華養生益智功) (Palmer 2008).  In the urban 
parks of Chengdu, even more groups practicing different methods could be found, as well as 
people practicing ballroom dancing, disco dancing, fencing, playing chess, doing taijiquan, or 
reading English books aloud. The qigong groups were part of a larger culture of 
spontaneously organized early morning activities in parks and public spaces, a favourite 
occupation of seniors, but also common among middle-aged people and students. All these 
activities were free, and anyone could join in and learn by imitation. There was no formal 
membership in any group, and anyone could start a group in some free space or empty 
corner of the park (Farquhar 2009). Most qigong practitioners were primarily interested in the 
health benefits of the methods, and others went for the social support of the group activity, 
but the group leaders were often enthusiastic converts and promoters of the miraculous 
benefits of their method. They were usually graduates of intensive qigong workshops, usually 
lasting a few days to a few weeks, which were offered by a qigong master.  
Each master had his own method, which he had either invented or claimed to have 
received in secret transmission before “coming out of the mountains” (chushan 出山) to 
publicly teach it to the masses. The method typically involved different types of exercises – 
body movement, breathing techniques, meditation – which were organized into progressive 
levels. The masters were typically highly entrepreneurial, charismatic individuals who crafted 
an image of themselves as inheriting the powers of ancient wizards and immortals, and 
possessing miraculous healing powers.  Their operations were made possible by a state-
sponsored organizational infrastructure, including qigong magazines which propelled masters 
into national fame through feature stories, and a handful of national qigong associations, such 
as the China Qigong Scientific Research Society (Zhongguo qigong kexue yanjiuhui 中國氣功科學
研究會), affiliated to the state sports, Chinese medicine, and science institutions, which 
facilitated masters’ national lecture tours and training workshops. While mass qigong activities 
in parks and public spaces were free, qigong activities generated considerable revenue through 
fee-charging lectures and workshops, qigong healing services, the sale of books and 
instructional videos, and sideline products such as water or tea leaves said to be imbued with 
the master’s healing qi. Revenues were typically split between the master who delivered the qi 
and his method, and the state-sponsored association which used its official, legal status and 
government connections to organize the lucrative lectures and workshops in various Work 
Units (Palmer 2007).  
Although the state-sponsored associations federated the leading qigong masters into a 
common organizational framework, there was fierce competition among the masters, who 
tried to attract more followers and even to poach practitioners from each other, by touting 
their superior healing powers, the antiquity or authenticity of their methods, the greater ease 
of learning of the techniques, the higher level of comprehensiveness of their systems, and 
the lower risk of “qigong deviations” (mental troubles caused by extreme qigong practice). This 
competition produced both standardization, as masters imitated each other in mimetic rivalty, 
and differentiation, as they each promoted some unique formula or model, sufficiently 
different from the others as to demarcate itself, but sufficiently similar as to remain within 
what had emerged as the conventional norms of a good qigong method.  
We clearly see the features of a market here. However, market relations were only 
part of the complex structure of the qigong milieu. At the grassroots, qigong was not driven by 
market exchanges, but by free activities in public spaces, often initiated by volunteers, 
constituting a gift economy of people helping and encouraging each other, and offering each 
other social support as well, forming a mass movement closely linked to the culture of 
popular, self-organized morning activities in parks. These masses of practitioners, however, 
formed the pool of potential customers which qigong masters and their organizations tried to 
turn into a market for their books, videos, training programs, and other products. And this 
market activity was structured and even made possible by the state-sponsored qigong 
associations and various government departments which organized and legitimized what was 
officially designated as the “qigong sector” (qigongjie 氣功界), in a way that was typical of the 
governmental culture of post-Mao China. Thus the qigong movement included, 
simultaneously and in mutual interaction, (1) a gift economy of grassroots self-organization, 
(2) commercial entrepreneurship and market relations, and (3) Chinese socialist political 
organization.  
All three of the above entailed different dynamics of social relations, each of which 
had its own logic. While most qigong groups combined all three to varying degrees, some 
qigong groups consciously attempted to align themselves with only one logic. Zhonggong, for 
instance, which was the largest qigong organization in the first half of the 1990’s, with a 
claimed following of 30 million, explicitly adopted a commercial corporate structure. Unlike 
most other qigong groups, instead of working under the umbrella of a state-sponsored qigong 
association at the national level, it registered its headquarters as a private company, 
developed a franchise model, gave financial incentives to its local branches and core 
practitioners, trained its leaders with Harvard MBA textbooks, and promoted a qigong 
method which maximised the efficiency of qi production as well as profit generation (Palmer 
2011a).  On the other hand, Falungong, which was launched by Li Hongzhi 李洪志 in 1992  
like any other qigong movement by charging fees for workshops and healing sessions 
facilitated by the state-sponsored China Qigong Scientific Research Society, from 1994 
onwards stopped holding workshops, and from 1996 disaffiliated itself from the Society. 
Falungong moved away from commercial exchange and integration in state institutions, 
positioning itself almost entirely within the sphere of autonomous self-organization, linking 
tens of thousands of local practice groups at the grassroots into a massive national network 
of millions of followers, not customers. This was possible because many practitioners felt 
gratitude and loyalty to Falungong for healing their illnesses and improving their health. Li 
Hongzhi stressed that their benefits came from the power of the master and his method, 
which he was selflessly offering to save the suffering multitudes. This was an important 
factor in Falungong’s popularity in the late 1990’s, even as most qigong groups were declining. 
While a trend of rampant commercialization in the qigong milieu dismayed growing numbers 
of pratitioners, Falungong stressed the strictly free and non-commercial nature of its 
activities, placing itself firmly in the gift economy (the sale of Li Hongzhi’s books, which 
were national bestsellers, did provide a lucrative income stream, but this was a sideline to the 
core relationship between the master and his followers). Falungong then eclipsed all other 
groups, becoming the largest qigong movement in China by the end of the 1990s, until it it 
was suppressed from 1999 onwards. Following this, the entire state-supported infrastructure 
of the qigong movement was dismantled (Palmer 2007).  
 
Diverging approaches to Daoist cultivation 
 
The commodification of religious cultural resources is a highly controversial issue in 
China today, widely debated in the media, among academics, and within religious circles. In 
August 2010, a heated polemic erupted around the case of Master Li Yi 李一, a young 
Daoist priest and manager of a monastery in the hills outside the city of Chongqing. This 
priest skilfully packaged Daoist meditation, health and healing practices, and attracted 
thousands of followers among well-heeled businessmen and pop stars, who came from all 
over China to follow his treatments and workshops. His temple prospered, and he quickly 
rose in the ranks of the state-run Daoist administration, being elected Deputy Chairman of 
the China Daoist Association in June 2010. His rapid success was not unanimously 
appreciated in Daoist circles, however. For some, he had found the key to making Daoism 
relevant and attractive to contemporary Chinese, combining age-old health secrets with 
modern marketing savvy. For others, however, the very fact that he was making fame and 
fortune out of Daoist techniques, was an unmistakable sign that his activity was not true 
Daoism. One Daoist wrote that such types of masters are “nothing more than itinerant 
swindlers,”  that their appearance was a sign of the “sinking” of the teachings, that, in the 
Daoist circle, “profiteers are numerous, and the righteous few.” These comments were made 
to me by the former deputy chairman of the Daoist Association of a famous Daoist sacred 
mountain, a gifted and widely admired young monk who was deeply devoted to his spiritual 
cultivation, and appeared set for a promising career in Daoist officialdom. However, 
dismayed by the politicization and commercialization of religious life in the monasteries, 
which, for him, was contributing to the decline of the religion, he had once considered 
launching a Daoist reform movement, perhaps a new sect which could purify the religion of 
its worldly corruption. But after much reflection and prayer, he came to the conclusion that 
there was no authoritative basis in the Daoist scriptures for launching a new movement, and 
so, instead, he decided to resign his leadership position in the Daoist Association, quit the 
monastic order, and live as an unknown urban hermit. He lives a simple life in a large city, 
has a small handful of disciples, and occasionally gives talks to groups that seek him out. 
Financially independent through support from his parents, material subsistence is not a 
concern for him, as long as he lives a simple and frugal lifestyle. In his relations with his 
disciples, he charges no fee; his teachings and advice are offered as a gift, and the essence of 
his advice is to avoid the desire for rewards from others – by giving of oneself to others, one 
will receive powers from gods and spiritual forces. An American entrepreneur, founder of a 
firm which sells Daoist qigong retreats and tours, offered to partner with him to offer 
lucrative packages for foreign tourists, but he refused, preferring to remain in obscurity and 
avoid being drawn into business schemes. In this case, our Daoist was critical of the 
marketization of Daoism, and even considered founding a sect, but, in the end, decided to 
stay completely outside the market. According to the religious market model, this individual 
is a “loser,” having only less than a dozen disciples, while the “winners” are the dynamic 
entrepreneurs who are able to capture a growing portion of the market for health and 
spiritual seekers, drawing thousands of clients; and it is the competition among such 
entrepreneurs which would make them more efficient providers of Daoist services and, 
ultimately, revitalize Daoism. For him, however, such commercial practices strip Daoism of 
its spiritual essence, and the ultimate loser would be Daoism itself. Without passing 
judgement on this Daoist’s grim assessment, what is important for my argument here is that 
the marketization of religion is the subject of a conscious critique within the religion itself, 
associated with religious behaviour which deliberately minimises market relations, and a 
norm of spiritual progress which is explicitly at odds with economists’ measures of success.  
There is nothing new about these debates: the tension between the worldly 
commercialization of magical techniques and the otherworldly hermit ideal runs through 
Daoist history. And the critique of profiteering by Daoist priests and Buddhist monks is an 
age-old theme in Chinese literature, often taken up by literati advocates of a pure spirituality, 
whom Vincent Goossaert calls “Confucian fundamentalists” (Goossaert 2006). This anti-
clerical discourse had real consequences: in the late 19th century and early 20th century,  it 
contributed to the denigration of Chinese religion, temples, and the Daoist and Buddhist 
clergies by China’s elites, to the positive reception of Christianity by a significant portion of 
the elite, and to the launching of Buddhist and, to a lesser degree, Daoist reform movements 
(Welch 1968; Nedostup 2009; Goossaert and Palmer 2011). These movements aimed to 
expurgate the “superstitious” ritual and magical services of clerics, to focus on purely 
spiritual and ethical pursuits, and, in consequence, to remove the religion from market 
relations.  
 
A Confucian volunteer movement 
 
I now turn to a Confucian volunteer movement in Beijing, the Yidan Xuetang 一耽
學堂  (see Billioud 2011), on which I have conducted interviews and ethnographic 
observation between 2008 and 2010. This is a group established in 2001, which takes 
inspiration from the life and writings of ancient and modern Chinese figures who exemplify 
an ideal of self-cultivation through the integration of thought and social praxis – ranging 
from Confucius himself to the early 20th century Confucian reformer Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 
(1893-1988), but also including Liang’s contemporary Wang Fengyi 王鳳儀 (1882-1938), a 
charismatic rural healer and promoter of girls’ education, and even Mao Zedong (1893-1976) 
in his youth. The movement’s founder, Pang Fei 逄飛, a philosophy graduate of Peking 
University, explains that it was the sight of crowds in the smoggy streets of Beijing, hurrying 
about here and there, in blind pursuit of their ambitions, walking in the same space but 
unconcerned for each other, which led him to wonder if it might be possible to rely on his 
natural dispositions to do something worthwhile for society. He established a group of 
student volunteers from several universities, who study the Confucian classics in small 
groups, give free lessons on the classics in primary schools, assemble at dawn to recite the 
texts, visit old army veterans and revolutionary activists, as well as rural villages, to absorb 
the moral lessons from their life stories and folk customs, and support the efforts of retired 
people to establish academies to teach moral education to children. From its student core, 
Yidan Xuetang volunteers now include young professionals and seniors, and there are 
groups in over a dozen Chinese cities.  
Since Yidan Xuetang takes its inspiration from Confucius, and the study and 
teaching of Confucian classics is an important part of its work, it has found itself associated 
with the broader trend of Confucian revivalism and National Studies (guoxue 國學), one of 
hundreds of groups, academies, enterprises and government agencies which, in a variety of 
ways, promote Confucian texts and traditions. It attracts as volunteers young and older 
people who wish to connect with China’s moral tradition and do something of value to 
society. Pang Fei is regularly invited to Confucian forums, events, and conferences 
sponsored by various public and private organizations. However, he is harshly critical of 
much of what goes on under the label of Confucianism, National Studies and classics-
recitation. He is especially critical of a tendency by local governments and official agencies, 
in alliance with private businesses, to stage Confucian-related events and promotions to 
build legitimacy or stimulate economic development. Although he willingly associates with 
the government and uses official slogans in his own discourse in order to provide official 
cover for his work, he has refused to engage in the logic of state-business collaboration 
which governs much of the officially-sponsored promotion of Confucianism and traditional 
culture, leading to the packaging of Confucianism into educational, entertainment, cultural 
and tourism products and event productions. As a result, there is little substance to Yidan 
Xuetang’s official relationships, the legal status of his organization remains weak, and it 
operates with bare-bone financial resources.  
Beyond refusing to engage in market relations, Pang Fei also refuses to engage in a 
quasi-market “promotion” of Confucianism and traditional culture. He is dismissive of 
projects to “disseminate” and “promote” (tuiguang 推廣) traditional culture, which may serve 
to increase the visibility of aspects of Chinese tradition or Confucianism, and increase 
people’s identification with it, but actually do nothing to change the moral structure of 
society – simply adding a Chinese/Confucian dressing to a modern way of life in which the 
moral spirit remains absent. Thus, Yidan Xuetang does not emphasize an identity according 
to a label such as “Confucian” – the focus is on nurturing and expressing the moral spirit of 
the Chinese people through promoting volunteer activities in which participants can find an 
outlet for their innate desire to show care and concern for each other. The spirit of volunteer 
involvement is more important than any concrete results: Pang Fei also rejects the “project” 
management model of many NGOs and foundations, in which activities are organized and 
funded with fixed objectives in mind. In organizing volunteer university students to teach 
the classics in primary schools, he refuses to advocate any specific teaching method or to 
train the volunteers, stressing the spirit of selfless giving and service, which touches the 
childrens’ hearts more than any pedagogical technique.  
Thus, Yidan Xuetang rejects all forms of instrumental rationality, whether it involve 
promoting traditional culture to an ever-larger population, or project design and 
management for more efficient delivery of social service or educational programmes. Such 
approaches, for Pang Fei, may distort the human spirit which is at the core of Yidan 
Xuetang’s work. In spite of early attempts to create rationalized organizational structures, the 
result is a loosely organized movement, in which enthusiasm is more important than 
systematization, and which, by Pang’s own admission, is “constantly on the brink of life and 
death.”  Here again, we see a case of consciously rejecting market relations, as well as the 
marketing culture of devising effective methods to “promote” one “brand” of Confucianism 
and recruit adherents to this brand. Yidan Xuetang is consciously seeking to create a space 
which is entirely outside the market and its models of operation. This space, founded on 
service to others through volunteerism, involves an expanding gift economy. And although 
Yidan xuetang is not explicitly religious, the logic of exchanges is similar to that of a religious 
gift economy: the collective memory of Chinese civilization and its sages is what is 
honoured; and the way to show gratitude and respect for Chinese tradition is to embody the 
generosity of the Chinese spirit by helping others.  
 
 A charismatic Buddhist healer and philanthropist 
 
With the extraordinary growth of China’s economy over the past decades, a new 
generation of successful business entrepreneurs and billionnaires has appeared, most of 
whom are incarnations of dreams of “rags to riches.” At the same time, the gap between the 
rich and poor has widened, and, far (and sometimes not so far) from the booming cities of 
the coasts, China’s impoverished rural hinterlands often suffer from declining public 
investment in health and education.  Many of the new barons of business have established 
charitable foundations to help alleviate poverty – a growing trend which is promoted by the 
Chinese state. In a bid to publicize generosity and encourage charity, many magazines and 
government bodies regularly publish honor rolls and lists of China’s “top philanthropists”. 
Most of them are wealthy real estate developers and pop stars – but one name that has been 
honoured is that of an illiterate, 80-year-old former beggar, Lin Dong 林東, a charismatic 
Buddhist healer who has donated tens of millions of dollars to build schools in poor villages 
all over China.  
 Born in 1930 in Putian 莆田, Fujian, Lin Dong became an orphan during his childhood 
and began a life of errant mendicacy. He married another beggar and, after the Peoples’ 
Republic was established in 1949, was assigned a job as a manual laborer, helping to ship 
loads of goods along the waterways of Guangdong province. In the 1970’s his right hand 
was chopped off in an accident, and a few years later he suffered from a stroke. In a state of 
near death, he had a vision of the Chinese Buddhist saint Jigong 濟公, who assured him that 
he would recover and entrusted him with the mission of rescuing those who suffer in the 
world.  
  After his vision of Jigong and his seemingly miraculous recovery from his stroke, Lin 
Dong established an altar to him and worshipped him in his home, and discovered that he 
had uncanny healing powers. The sick flocked to him from all quarters. He dictated 
prescriptions of Chinese herbs and exhorted them to do good deeds, to accumulate good 
karma and attain cosmic recompense. Many were cured and became his followers. Full of 
gratitude to him for saving their lives, they are willing to do anything for him. Lin Dong 
encourages them to donate money, and they gladly respond; living a simple life and wearing 
cheap clothes, he offers all the funds collected to build schools and homes for the aged. As a 
result, although he has no wealth of his own, Lin Dong has raised and donated sums 
comparable to those given by China’s richest business tycoons. And for those of his 
followers who have little money to offer, he encourages them to offer their time as 
volunteers, visiting the poor and the elderly.  
Lin Dong’s experience and philanthropic actions are deeply rooted in China’s religious 
culture of cosmic recompense. “To become a Buddhist”, he says, “is like opening a bank 
account: we should try our best to make credits through good deeds, instead of continuous 
debits; if we continuously draw from the account we will have a deficit, and if we do not 
make repayment to the overdrawn account, nobody will help us to settle it. The more 
industriously we foster charitable deeds, the more our recompense will increase.” (A Paradise 
2008).  
This example describes a system of economic relations at many levels. We see a 
charismatic healer as the central node of flows of healing energy and money: healing power 
understood to be flowing from the god Jigong to him and from him to sick clients, and 
philanthropic donations flowing from his clients to him and from him to recipients. 
Exchanges occur both at a material and spiritual level, and banking metaphors are even used 
to explain how to obtain spiritual rewards.   
But is it a market? Lin Dong is listed as one of many Chinese philanthropists. The 
others are successful business entrepreneurs. As with Lin Dong, money comes their way and 
they distribute it to others. Does this mean that they are operating within the same logic of 
exchange? If so, why does Lin Dong donate most of his income, and the business leaders 
only donate a small fraction? Lin Dong has a thousand devoted followers who are ready to 
freely donate their cash to him, fully trusting in him and what he does with it, and who remain 
tied to him and his gods even long after they have “paid back” for their cures. Why don’t any 
of the business leaders have such followers, in spite of their philanthropy? Is Lin Dong’s 
Buddhist organization really a “firm” in the same sense as those business entrepreneurs’ real 
estate development corporations?  
The religious market theory solves these problems through concepts of 
“compensators” (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 6) or, in more recent iterations, “otherworldly 
rewards” (Stark and Finke 2000: 277). The reference to otherworldly rewards in Lin Dong’s 
case is explicit, and even couched in monetary terms. Through their charitable donations, 
one can say that Lin Dong’s followers are purchasing otherworldly rewards. Stark and Finke 
have put their finger on the crux of the matter. But the crucial question should then be, what 
type of economy is created when otherworldly or spiritual rewards are added to the equation?  
A market exchange is a dyadic relationship in which pay-outs and rewards are given 
and received by the two parties only (or their proxies). In the religious relationships 
exemplified by the case of Lin Dong and his followers, however, a different logic is at work. 
Here, the rewards are spiritual and are understood to come from a spiritual source; they are 
described with terms such as gongde 功德  (karmic merit) or baoying 報應  (cosmic 
recompense). Obtaining these spiritual rewards is an explicit goal, and motivates giving 
behaviour – but the rewards are expected from a spiritual source and not from the receiver of the 
gift. Neither Lin Dong, nor the recipients of charitable aid, are expected to return a favour or 
service in exhange for the donation. One does not enter into relationships with people in 
order to obtain reciprocal rewards from them, but from a “third party”—the spiritual or 
divine source of rewards. When Lin Dong offers free healings, or when he offers generous 
philanthropic donations, he asks for nothing in return; and such benevolence is understood 
as generating infinitely more valuable spiritual rewards. At the same time, Lin Dong’s 
patients feel gratitude and a desire to reciprocate – but Lin Dong encourages them to 
express their gratitude by doing good deeds for others than himself through volunteering and 
philanthropic donations, replicating the pattern of Lin Dong’s altruism and generating 
spiritual rewards for themselves. And Lin Dong’s altruism is patterned on his relationship 
with the god Jigong, who healed him from his own sufferings; and whom he is thanking 
through his compassionate deeds for others. Rather than the calculated mutual costs and 
benefits of a closed diad of reciprocal exchanges, the result is a culture of giving and an 
expanding community in which social relationships are based on service to others.  
 To be sure, the participants in this network gain many worldly rewards as well. Lin 
Dong visibly enjoys the attention of his grateful followers and eagerly seeks public 
recognition for his deeds – claiming that he hopes, through his example, to encourage 
thousands of people to become philanthropists. His followers, in addition to their healings, 
gain a warm and caring social network, and new, empowering social roles. One may wonder 
to what extent Lin Dong and his followers are sincerely motivated, or if they are mainly 
drawn by the palpable social rewards which accrue to them, or some combination of the 
two. But the question is perhaps irrelevant, since the two classes of rewards do not 
necessarily exclude each other. Most important is that the very structure of the social 
relations of this community is based on the religious principles of this-worldly altruism for 
otherworldly rewards – an economy of exchanges between people in which one does not 
seek rewards from other people, but from the gods and karmic recompense. And it is 
because of this logic of exchanges that Lin Dong and his movement are in a different class 
from businessmen and their firms.  
 
Analysis 
 
The cases I have presented are quite diverse, and the first conclusion to be drawn is 
that each case encapsulates a complex combination and interpenetration of different 
modalities of exchange, of which market and gift relations are only two of several possible 
modes of sociality.   
Our cases show that market exchanges do exist in the religious sphere: there are 
markets for religious books; markets for religious objects, amulets and so on; markets for 
religious services ranging from funeral rituals to training courses; markets for religious and 
spirtual tourist products ranging from scenic spots to hotels, package tours, and so on. 
Religious markets are indeed an inevitable component of the total market economy of any 
society. However, these represent only part of the picture, while gift economies are at the 
core of the religious groups and movements studied.  
 Furthermore, in the three cases of the Daoist urban “hermit”, the Confucian 
“volunteer”, and the Buddhist “philanthropist”, we see conscious attempts to generate forms 
of relating to others which would result from a spiritual practice and orientation to life. 
While the hermit and the volunteer explicitly critique the marketization of China’s spiritual 
tradition, and consciously position themselves outside the logic of the market, the 
philanthropist, following the god and karma, upsets the conventional rationality of financial 
flows. While all three have a message which they are devoted to sharing with others, their 
sensitivity to the spiritual quality of social relations is more important than numerical 
objectives such as numbers of members or the extent of the spread of their message.  These 
are entirely non-market forms of social relations, which, each in a different way, are premised 
on giving and obligation.  
If we refer to the five “modalities of doing religion” described by Chau in his 
contribution to this issue, we may find that although both market and non-market relations 
can be found in each of the modalities, there may be more or less affinity between a specific 
modality and a specific model of exchange. For example, the “immediate-practical” modality 
lends itself easily to market exchanges through the provision, for a fee, of one-off magical 
rites or divination services for individuals or the sale of charms and talismans. In the 
“discursive-scriptural”, the “personal-cultivational” and the “liturgical” modalities, we can 
find both market and non-market forms, either combined in a single event production such 
as the communal jiao rituals or in the organizational infrastructure of mass qigong movements, 
or in conscious opposition to each other, such as in competing views and practices of Daoist 
cultivation or Confucian revivalism.  The “relational” modality, however, consisting of 
building social relations between humans and deities (or ancestors) and between human 
worshippers, and based on notions of laiwang 來往 and guanxi 關係 (Chau, this issue, p. ___), 
seems by definition to be based on a gifting model.  
Awareness of the difference between market and non-market relations runs through 
the Chinese religious field, in which actors, consciously or not, position themselves as 
market or non-market operators, reflect and debate on the merits of both modes of 
operation, and sometimes build their identity around their acceptance or rejection of 
commercial models. The distinction between market and non-market relations produces 
shifting and contested lines of differentiation in the Chinese religious field, cutting through 
religious traditions.  
Given this variety of forms of exchange, a useful question would be to ask under 
what conditions different forms expand or contract. Indeed, we can speak of a process of 
“marketization” of religion, when an increasing range of religious activities becomes 
subsumed under the logic of market transactions. A detailed treatment of this question is 
beyond the scope of this article. But a few observations may be useful: (1) there is nothing 
new about the marketization of various forms of religious services and practices in China, 
which has been widespread at least since the Song dynasty, from the 10th century onwards 
(von Glahn 2004); (2) since the 20th century, urbanization and the shift away from from the 
sedentary, ascriptive communities of agrarian culture, to the more mobile, unaffiliated 
populations of immigrant metropolises – as well as the subsequent weakening of communal 
religious culture, further reinforced by political campaigns and restrictions, has vastly 
increased the population who lack religious knowledge, culture and community, and thus 
constitute a vast potential market for those who would provide packaged solutions to 
unaffiliated individuals. The expansion of the market economy has provided favourable 
conditions for those forms of Chinese religion which have traditionally operated as what 
Stark and Bainbridge call “client cults” (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 209); while other types of 
ascriptive communal religion have, in the big cities, either withered and disappeared (when 
not banned outright), or transformed themselves to adapt to the logic of market relations. (3) 
Owing to restrictions on non-governmental and non-commercial forms of association in 
China, and to the government’s preference for economic development as the main sphere 
for the deployment of social forces and cooperation between the state and society, there is 
more legal space for the development of marketised derivatives of religion than non-
governmental quasi-market or non-market forms. All of these factors create the objective 
conditions for the increasing marketization of religion in China – a trend which can only be 
reinforced by the pervasive commercialization of ever greater realms of culture in general.  
At the same time, these same objective conditions also lead to an opposing 
tendency – a desire for other forms of social relations and orientations in life, which are not 
tainted by the instrumental exchanges of commercial life. Both outside and inside religious 
communities, a discourse arises which condemns the commercialization of religious practices, 
and aspires for a more pure form of religion. Robert Weller (1999: chapter 5), looking at the 
case of Taiwan, has indeed argued that the rise of a market economy leads to what he calls a 
“split market” religious culture in which we find two types of religious actors: while amoral 
cults fetishize market relationships, moralizing religions attempt to create an alternative type 
of community based on a non-commercialized morality – even as they help their members 
to function successfully in the market economy. Weller attributes the growth of Yiguandao 
to this tendency. As discussed above, Falungong also corresponded to a similar tendency in 
mainland China in the 1990s – and, today, the same could probably said of much of the 
spectacular growth of Christianity (F. Yang 2005; Cao 2011).  
Both critics (Bruce 1993) and defenders (Iannacone 1995) of the market theory have 
noted the commodification of religion in North America and debated whether this trend 
explains the theory itself – but neither have addressed the distinctions, competition, and 
mutual influences between commercial forms of religion and those that are not. To the 
extent that consumerism and marketing have become pervasive in contemporary culture, 
business attitudes and practices have even seeped into non-commercial religious groups, 
some of which adopt corporate models of management and marketing – as described by Cao 
Nanlai in his study of Christian entrepreneurs and their churches in the coastal city of 
Wenzhou. On the other hand, if these “boss Christians” zealously contribute to the 
development of their churches in order to convert economic into cultural capital, it is 
precisely because the non-commercial nature of the churches is perceived as having a 
different quality and legitimacy, which is lacking in their business enterprises (Cao 2010: 95-
96). It is thus puzzling that the market theory of religion is oblivious to the distinction 
between market and non-market exchanges: indeed, the most significant competition and 
interpenetration is, perhaps, that between the two forms of social relations. 
Religious market theorists might respond that such scenarios, and the religious gift 
economy I have outlined, simply describe another type of market: these are diverse ways of 
purchasing otherworldly rewards. Such groups are producing a supply of non-commercial 
religious life, meeting a demand in society. According to this reasoning, whenever there is a 
dynamic of supply and demand, there is a market, no matter the form of exchange. But 
surely one would not call family relations a “market” on account of the presence of multiple 
“suppliers” to meet the “demand” for love, even in the presence of competition for 
affection. Nor does a community constitute a “market” when residents, through informal 
acts and organized projects, “supply” volunteer services to the community to meet its needs 
or “demands.” 
When religious groups engage in a conscious critique of the commercialization of 
human relations and attempt to exemplify an alternative; and when marketization, by 
weakening traditional forms of solidarity, creates both the conditions and the demand for 
such alternatives, we are surely dealing with a phenomenon of sociological significance -- 
which merits being highlighted in any conceptual framework, rather than papered over by 
subsuming it into an expanded definition of a market.   
In this article, I have outlined the religious gift economy as a model of non-market 
relations arising from the observation and analysis of ethnographic cases in China. I have 
noted how market and gift economies coexist, compete, and combine in complex ways. I 
have discussed the trend of religious marketisation, which accompanies the weakening of 
ascriptive religious gift economies, but also a growing thirst for new forms of non-market 
sociality and religious life. To be sure, a religious gift economy is not the only possible model 
of non-market relations in the religious sphere, and there are undoubtedly other types of 
non-market relations which do not fit into the gifting model. Owing to lack of space, this 
article has merely offered a preliminary sketch of these issues. Only further research can 
explore the many other implications of the contrast and interplay between market and non-
market relations in the religious economy. 
The religious market theory opens a host of fruitful questions for scholars of 
religion. We face a choice between two strategies of investigation. The first is to postulate 
that all religious behaviour constitutes a market exchange. And, undoubtedly, valuable 
insights can be gained from applying market metaphors to other fields, just as theories of 
religion have been used to analyse non-religious phenonena such as football matches or 
political movements. But, as Stark and Bainbridge have themselves stressed, such a 
conceptual extension, by erasing the distinction between groups that do or don’t base 
themselves on supernatural beliefs, makes it impossible to theorize the link between such 
beliefs and social behaviour: “to do so makes it needlessly difficult to explore conflicts 
between these contrary systems of thought or to identify the rather different capacities 
present in each”; in fact, “it makes no more sense to equate them than to equate totem poles 
and telephone poles.” (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 3). I contend that the same logic applies 
to the extension of market concepts: the link between market relations and human behaviour 
can only be understood if the concept of the market is only applied to market relations, 
strictly defined, and not to relationships which lack the defining characteristics of a market 
transaction.  
The second strategy, then, is to empirically identify those types of religious behaviour 
which are market relations, to analyse their properties, and derive models of their dynamics. 
But since such an exercise will inevitably lead us to identify other, non-market types of 
religious relations, new questions arise as to the nature of these non-market relations. What 
are their properties; are there different models of non-market religious relations; what are 
their dynamics? How do they contrast with each other and with market relations? How do 
they interact with each other? To blanket all of these under a single, extended concept of the 
market obscures the fundamental distinctions between them and, ultimately, blots out the 
primary question of the sociology of religion: what types of social relations are constituted by 
religion? 
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